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This study was concerned with the possibility of 
training for conservation. With the component elements 
held constant across all groups, the effectiveness of two 
methods of presentation, cognitive conflict and active par­
ticipation, were tested by a pretest-training-posttest pro­
cedure using a 2 x 2 design with a common control group. 
Within the treatment groups, a conflict presentation of 
addition-subtraction and perceptual components was con­
trasted with a non-conflict presentation of the same 
addition-subtraction and perceptual components, each in a 
separate series. An active manipulation procedure was con­
trasted with passive participation. Results indicated that 
conservation responses increased within the treatment 
groups significantly more than in the control group, but no 
significant differences were found among the training pro­
cedures. The fact that there was no increase in the vocab­
ulary score from pre- to posttest suggested that the 
training procedures did not cause an increase in under­
standing of vocabulary.
Possible reasons for failure to obtain significant
differences within the training groups were discussed, and
a possible alternative procedure was suggested. In addition,
the possibility of using identity-type test questions
viii
instead of equality-type questions was considered.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Jean Piaget, the noted Swiss child psychologist, has 
theoretically explained and empirically demonstrated that 
the cognitive development of the child proceeds in an order­
ly and predictable manner through relatively distinct 
stages. His approach considers both the stages and the 
processes by which they develop. He considers three main 
stages, sensorimotor, concrete operational, and formal 
operational, and a substage between sensorimotor and con­
crete operational called pre-operational. Within each 
stage there are characteristic cognitive achievements.
This paper is concerned with the concrete operational stage, 
focusing specifically on the acquisition of conservation. 
Piaget defines conservation as "the invariance of a charac­
teristic despite transformations of the object or of a 
collection of objects possessing this characteristic 
(1963, p. 973)."
Two general questions arise in relation to Piaget’s 
concept of conservation, one concerning how conservations 
naturally develop, and the other concerning whether they 
can be induced through the proper training procedure. The 
first question is essentially theoretical; this paper will
1
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be concerned with it only as background for investigating 
the second question. However, it should be noted that 
theoretical questions may be answered in part by discover­
ing the proper training procedure to teach conservation.
The factors involved in studies attempting to advance 
the process of intellectual development fall into two major 
groups. The first group is concerned with isolating the 
essential components of conservation; the second consists 
of attempts to discern the most effective procedures for 
training. There is, in addition, a third group of studies 
in which methodological problems are investigated, e.g., 
the vocabulary used in testing. All three types of inves­
tigation bear some relation to the present study, and 
indeed, to all studies relating to teaching conservation.
Piaget’s work has stimulated much research. However, 
the wide range of his ideas has led to such a variety of 
procedures and to so much contradiction among results that 
it is difficult to evaluate the work in the area. This 
lack of systemization has been one of the more telling 
criticisms made by theorists of different persuasions. It 
is hoped that the present study will bring some order to 
the area, if by no other means than at least by presenting 
an explicit statement of what was done.
This study falls into the second group mentioned 
above; it will investigate the relative effectiveness of 
two procedural variables, cognitive conflict and active
manipulation, on the acquisition of conservation of sub­
stance, while attempting to hold the component elements 
constant. The specific hypotheses will be stated following 




The theoretical and empirical literature relevant to 
this study will be discussed under two headings. The first 
division will present the more general concepts of Piaget’s 
theory of cognitive development as a background for under­
standing the empirical investigations. Specifically, it 
will more formally present the stages of intellectual 
development, will explain the concepts of conservation and 
equilibration, and will discuss the kinship of the equili­
bration theory to learning theory.
The second division will contain reviews of the con­
servation studies, including discussions of the procedures 
aimed at discovering the elements or components of con­
servation, those concerned with conservation training pro­
cedures, and those dealing with methodological problems 
such as language and testing materials.
Piagetian Concepts Related to the Present Study 
Summary of the Stages in Intellectual Development
Piaget describes several stages of intellectual 
functioning. In the first stage, the sensory-motor stage, 
the child learns "object identity," i.e., that one item can
4
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be in two places in succession, and that it remains the same 
even though it is moved or is out of his sight for awhile.
In this and in the second stage, the pre-operational phase, 
the child comes to evaluate his environment in terms of the 
way it appears. Then, in the concrete operational stage, 
which begins around seven years of age, he begins to rely 
on logic rather than perception to interpret concrete 
situations. His entrance into the concrete operational 
stage is marked by his attainment of conservation of sub­
stance— the knowledge that the mass of an object remains 
unchanged even though the object itself changes shape. 
Throughout the operational stage he learns to "conserve" 
various aspects of his environment, including weight, 
volume, number, length, and area. His understanding of 
objective time and distance also develop during this stage. 
All in all, he comes to disregard irrelevant perceptual 
cues and to understand which aspects of reality remain un­
changed despite transformations. When he begins to under­
stand the changes symbolically and no longer needs concrete 
examples before him, he is said to enter the formal opera­
tional stage, which is the most mature form of intellectual 
functioning.
Relation of Conservation to Age and Sex
Although Piaget gives approximate ages when specific 
conservations are attained, these are only rough guides. 
Pratoomraj and Johnson (1966) confirmed Piaget’s contention
6
that conservation increases with age. Goldschmid (1967) has 
shown that though there is some correlation between con­
servation and age (r = .30) there is a higher one between 
conservation and mental age (r = .50). That mental age 
rather than chronological age is the important factor has 
also been indicated by Goodnow and Bethon (1966) and Hood 
(1962).
The relationship between sex and conservation has also 
been investigated by Goodnow and Bethon (1966) who observed 
that boys appeared to do better, but the difference was 
significant on only two of ten conservation tasks. However, 
Pratoomraj and Johnson found no sex differences.
Conservation
Piaget explains that during the concrete operational 
stage, each conservation develops in four steps. Each step 
is a more or less stable mode of responding, or, as Piaget 
would say, each step is in a state of equilibrium (Flavell, 
1963). In the first step the subject centers on a partic­
ular perceptual cue, such as height, in judging, e.g., 
whether one sausage has more or less quantity than another. 
As the interaction between subject and object continues, he 
eventually notices another property, such as length, and 
begins to concentrate on it. He may even alternate his 
attention, but the "centrations,, are always successive and 
isolated. Only in the third step does he hesitate, con­
sidering both simultaneously. In the fourth step he
7
recognizes which transformations leave the quantity invar­
iant, and thereafter gives unequivocal conservation 
responses.
In effect, a fully developed conservation may be under 
stood as a concept, for it meets the five essential features 
of a concept outlined by Vinacke (1951)•
1. Concepts are not direct sensory data but some­
thing resulting from the elaboration, combination, 
etc., thereof. . . .
2. . . .  concepts depend upon the previous 
experience of the organism. . . •
3. Concepts are responses which tie together, or 
link, or combine discreet sensory experiences. . . ,
4. It may be inferred that such ties or links are 
symbolic in nature; that is, the same response stands 
for a variety of data. . . .
5. On the side of internal processes of the 
organism, concepts represent selective factors. An 
external stimulus arouses a symbolic response, on the 
one hand, or a symbolic response guides a perceptual 
response, whichever comes first (p. 2).
That conservations are real phenomena has been sub­
stantially validated (Dodwell, 1961; Elkind, 1961a, 1961b; 
Goldschmid, 1967; Hood, 1962. Also see Baldwin, 1967; 
Flavell, 1963). Further, different kinds of conservation 
have been found to appear in a predictable order. With 
rarely an exception, children learn to conserve substance 
first, then weight and length, and later volume and number. 
However, acceptance of the conservations as real occur­
rences raises two questions: (1) how do the conservations 
naturally develop from one stage to the other? and (2) can 




Piaget explains the natural emergence of conserva­
tions in terms of his equilibrium theory, which includes 
(1) equilibrium stages, and (2) an equilibration process. 
Mental development, Piaget says, is the process of going 
through stages of equilibrium, such as the steps in the 
attainment of a conservation. Thus a conservation is a 
particular structure which comes into equilibrium; the 
coming is the process of equilibration. Piaget concen­
trates mainly on the forms the structures take, explaining 
their elements in terms of mathematical models and set 
theory. Still, his equilibration process does attempt to 
cope with the transition mechanism.
The mechanism of transition that governs the 
organism's movement from state to state which 
Piaget proposes is an equilibration process. This 
process, continuously operating in all exchanges 
between the growing subject and his environment, is 
the propellant for change and transition. . . .
This continuous process of equilibration gives rise to successive essentially discontinuous equilibrium 
states. that is, organized systems of actions 
(sensory-motor, perceptual, concrete operational, 
and all the other totalities already familiar to the 
reader) whose attributes as systems are describable 
in equilibrium terms (Flaveil, 1963, p. 23S).
According to Piaget’s theory (1952) there are two
primary processes— assimilation and accommodation— which
are operational throughout all stages of intellectual
functioning. Assimilation refers to the change that an
individual induces in a stimulus to enable himself to cope
with it. Accommodation refers to the changes he must make
in his response behavior. These are complimentary aspects
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of the process of adaptation, each being more or less 
necessary in any stimulus presentation. In a state of 
equilibrium, assimilation and accommodation are balanced, 
and Piaget invokes the notion of probability to explain the 
maintenance of the equilibrium state. If a situation occurs 
which forces either assimilation or accommodation to take 
precedence, such as when a novel object is encountered, or 
when the individual, on the basis of probability, notices a 
new dimension to an old object, equilibrium is destroyed.
The equilibration process, through the adaptation mechanism, 
eventually brings the individual to a new state of equilib­
rium.
Piaget (1952) explains the equilibration process as 
follows:
The organism is a cycle of physiochemical and kinetic 
processes which, in constant relation to the environ­
ment , are engendered by each other . . . .  The rela- 
tionship__which unites the organized elements [of the 
organism^ . . . with the environmental elements 
. . . , is therefore a relationship of assimilation, 
that is to say, the functioning of the organism does 
not destroy it but conserves the cycle of organiza­
tion and coordinates the given data of the environ­
ment in such a way as to incorporate them into that 
cycle. Let us suppose that, in environment, a varia­
tion is produced which transforms x into x ?. Either 
the organism does not adapt and the cycle ruptures, 
or else adaptation takes place, which means that the 
organized cycle has been modified by closing up on 
itself . . . .
If we call this result of the pressures exerted by 
the environment accommodation . . . , we can accord­
ingly say that adaptation is an equilibrium between 
assimilation and accommodation.
This definition applies to intelligence as well. 
Intelligence is assimiIation to the extent that it 
incorporates all the given data of experience within 
its framework . . . .
There can be no doubt either, that mental life is
1C
also accommodation to the environment. Assimilation 
can never be pure because by incorporating new 
'elements into its earlier schemata the intelligence 
constantly modifies the latter in order to adjust them 
to new elements. Conversely, things are never known 
by themselves, since this work of accommodation is 
only possible as a function of the inverse process of 
assimilation (pp. 5-7).
Flavell (1963) interprets Piaget thus:
Piaget views the equilibration-equilibrium inter­
pretation as in no sense an alternative to more con­
ventional interpretations of change mechanisms, i.e., 
maturation and learning (physical and social). On 
the contrary, the equilibration-equilibrium model is 
conceived as a very general affair which presupposes 
the causal contributions of maturation and learning 
but subsumes them . . . »  Although Piaget does not 
phrase it quite this way, one could regard the model 
as a high-altitude view of the developmental terrain, 
which necessarily renders indistinguishable certain 
features (which are nonetheless ’’really there”) in 
order to distinguish others (also ’’really there” but 
imperceptible at lower altitudes) (p. 239).
Kinship to Learning Theory
Piaget’s explanation of mental functioning is not 
incompatible with learning theory explanations. As 
Berlyne (1965) has show., they are quite similar in at 
least two respects. First, the processes they describe are 
essentially the same. The acquisition and use of internal 
mediating responses, along with stimulus and response 
generalization and discrimination, closely parallel Piaget’s 
assimilation-accommodation process. Piaget (1952, 
pp. 34-35) even refers to the generalizing aspect of assim­
ilation (without meaning to imply consciousness or inten­
tion). Second, Piaget’s view of motivation and reinforce­
ment is essentially a drive-reduction interpretation.
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Piaget does not deal directly with these two concepts, yet 
he implies that a novel situation compels the individual to 
try to incorporate the situation into his understanding of 
the environment. The accomplishment of this goal reduces 
the drive and so in itself is reinforcing; it also produces 
reinforcement when the individual finds that he is more able 
to cope with his environment.
A.full comparison of equilibration theory and learn­
ing theory is beyond the scope of this paper. However, be­
cause the contention between theorists of the two persua­
sions as to which theory best explains learning and cogni­
tion is the starting point for much of the experimental 
work in the field, it may be helpful to compare certain 
aspects of the two theories briefly. Perhaps the following 
quotation expresses Piaget’s conception of their relation­
ship most concisely:
Verbal or cogitative intelligence is based on 
practical or sensorimotor intelligence which in turn 
depends on acquired and recombined habits and 
associations. These presuppose, furthermore, the 
system or reflexes whose connection with the organ­
ism's anatomical and morphological structure is 
apparent. A certain continuity exists, therefore, between intelligence and the purely biological 
processes of morphogenesis and adaptation to the 
environment (Piaget, 1952, p. 1).
On his part, Piaget’s main objection to behaviorist 
theory is that it fails to consider the contributions of 
the child in the process of learning and instead conceives 
of him as a totally passive recipient of whatever habits 
his environment bestows upon him (Piaget, 1950).
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Much of the controversy between the two theoretical 
positions is based on a gross difference in approach. The 
behaviorists study the specific variables which influence 
learning and performance, in carefully designed experiments, 
with conservatively interpreted results. Their main concern 
is the effect the environment has on the individual. Piaget 
has a rather global theory, concerned less with specific 
factors of acquisition and performance and more with the on­
going processes of mental development. Although recognizing 
the importance of the environment in influencing the devel­
opment of intelligence, he centers his interest on the nature 
of the changes in the individual.
There are several other sources of misunderstanding.
(1) Because most of Piaget’s research has been concerned 
with the investigation of children’s thinking at specific 
periods in their growth and with the general differences 
between the periods, and because his theory is so broad and 
is not very explicit, it is easy to assume that the theory 
is a purely maturational one, as Gagne (196B) has done.
(2) Because the theory is very complex, and further, because 
Piaget is not easy to read either in the original French 
(Flavell, 1963, pp. vii-xi), or in English, and translations 
are sometimes even misleading (Furth, 1967, p. £22), there 
has been a great deal of misunderstanding about various 
aspects of the theory. (3) Another source of misunderstand­
ing is the distinction Piaget makes between mental struc­
tures and mental functions. The distinction creates a
13
semantic confusion, for what he classifies as functional is 
the area that more conventional American psychologists deal 
with in a structural manner. Stimulus-response connections 
(habits) are generally conceived of as comprising the 
structural components of intelligence, while Piaget views 
the same subject as the processes of assimilation and 
accommodation. Furthermore, his discussions of structure 
are concerned with what might be considered trains of 
thought, which American psychologists view as mental 
functioning.
Review of Conservation Studies 
A child who conserves substance realizes that 
changing the shape of an object does not alter the amount 
of material it contains; he knows that the amount can only 
be altered by the addition of a like substance or by sub­
traction of some of the original mass. This conservation of 
substance, being the first one achieved, marks the child’s 
entrance into the concrete operational stage of mental 
functioning.
. . . a correct conservation response implies more 
than a simple awareness of invariance: it marks the 
end of intuitive reasoning even as it signals the 
beginning of the concrete level of operations 
(Piaget, 1967); more important, it is the first 
evidence of the coordinated use of the operations of 
identity, reversibility and combinativity— operations which, together with associativity and tautology or 
iteration, not only define concrete reasoning, but 
serve as the essential elements from which the 
child’s intellectual structure will be constructed 
(Lefrancois, 1965, pp. 277-275).
The main question in the present study concerns the
14
precocious development of conservation. There are two 
recent' studies which indicate that conservation can indeed 
be hastened through training. Lefrancois (1968) has devel­
oped a hierarchy of subordinate capabilities which are 
necessary to the conservation of substance (see Table 1).
In checking the reliability of the levels in his hierarchy, 
he found that $6 of 60 subjects had "perfect scores,"
i.e., after missing all the questions at one level, all 
subsequent levels were failed. Furthermore, he reports that 
25 of 40 subjects given training based on his hierarchy 
developed conservation, whereas none of 20 matched control 
subjects did. However, he fails to explain the specific 
procedures he used in training his subjects.
Kingsley and Hall (1967), using Gagne’s accumulative 
learning approach, also attempted to analyze the material 
to be included in a hierarchy of subtasks for conservation 
of weight and length. However, they emphasized experiential 
rather than internal variables, claiming, with much justifi­
cation, that many of the previous attempts at training con­
servation have ignored the large amount of background 
knowledge necessary to acquire conservation. The hierarchy 
they developed is presented in Table 2. It may be observed 
that this heirarchy is similar in order to that presented 
by Lefrancois. The main difference is the inclusion here 
of knowledge pertaining to the objective verification of 
equivalence. Hall and Kingsley (1968) have pointed out the 







Hierarchy of Subordinate Capabilities 
for Conservation of Substance
Combinativity
What has been gained 
in height is lost in 
thickness (or vice 
versa) *
The ability to under 




The ability to discrim- Illb. 
inate between amounts 
in objects of different 
height (width constant)
Identity
Nothing has been 
added or taken 
away *




The ability to 
discriminate be­
tween amounts in 
objects of different 
width (height 
constant)
The ability to equate 
amounts in objects of 
identical shapes
The ability to discrim­
inate between different 
widths




(Lefrancois, 196B, p. 2?£)
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TABLE 2
Knowledge Hypothesized to be Necessary for 
-Weight and Length Conservation Arranged 
in Order of Difficulty Beginning 
at the Kindergarten Level
Weight
1. Know the meaning of appropriate relational terms, 
i.e., heavier, lighter, equal, more, less, same.
2. Know the meaning of weight independent of amount of 
substance.
3. Know what a scale is and how to determine heavier, 
lighter, and equal on it.
4. Know the scale is more accurate than kinesthetic cues.
5. Know the effect of adding and subtracting clay on 
weight.
6. Know the effect of changing shape on weight regardless 
of other exterraneous cues (i.e., labels and appear­ance ).
Length
1. Know the meaning of appropriate relational terms, 
i.e., longer, shorter, etc.
2. Know how to measure length with an independent third 
measuring instrument.
3. Know that use of a measuring stick is more accurate 
than visual cues.
4. Know the effect of adding and subtracting at the ends on length.
5. Know the effect of moving the object on length 
regardless of other exterraneous cues.
(Kingsley and Hall, 1967, p. 1114)
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which does pose both methodological and theoretical 
problems.
The training procedure that Kingsley and Hall (1967) 
used was very effective. However, though the procedures 
were fairly standardized at each level (Table 2), different 
procedures were used at different levels, so that it is 
impossible to evaluate which tactics had what effect.
(This, in itself, is not meant as a criticism of the results 
of this study for, in fact, their thesis had nothing to do 
with the specific procedures used.) Kingsley and Hall did 
attempt to describe their procedures, but they failed to 
report the specific stimuli presented to each child.
Because they had so much interaction with the child and 
used subjective means of reinforcement by randomly en­
couraging the children and praising correct predictions, 
there is much room in their procedures for experimenter 
bias. To train conservation they used procedures that have 
elsewhere been called feedback, labeling, perceptual train­
ing, addition-subtraction training, verbal rule instruction, 
demonstration, and subject manipulation. Therefore, al­
though they demonstrated that conservation can be taught, 
they fail to throw any light on which methods are most 
effective.
These two studies, i.e., Kingsley and Hall (1967) and 
Lefrancois (196$), were aimed more at all aspects of the 
elements of conservation. They each attempted to include 
all the components of their respective conservations. The
former seems to have used any and all methods which have in 
any way been proven effective. The latter fails completely 
to report specific training procedures. However, to under­
stand how conservation might best be taught, it would seem 
advisable to investigate in greater detail both the com­
ponent elements and the specific procedures.
Components of Conservation
Identity. There have been a number of studies con­
cerned with the investigation of the specific elements that 
contribute to the development of conservation. Of these, 
perhaps the most basic and the least investigated is 
identity. As Elkind (1967) has indicated, conservation of 
substance involves recognition of the identity of the mass 
of an object before and after transformation. Yet in the 
usual routine, the subject is asked to recognize the equiv­
alence of two objects which initially were equal but one of 
which has been transformed. The child is asked to judge 
equality of 5 and V, then V is changed to V* and the ques­
tion is asked: "Does S = V ’ ?" That 3 = V' follows 
logically from the facts that S = V and V = V’. This pro­
cedure is the one Piaget used, and it seems to be the 
simplest way to get at the question of identity. However,
. . . the conservation problem can be said to assess 
two types of conservation: equivalence and identity. 
The conservation of identity, however, must always 
be inferred from the child’s responses, whereas the 
conservation of equivalence is reflected directly in 
the child's judgments. Consequently, the conserva­
tion of identity would seem to be a necessary but
19
not a sufficient condition for the attainment of equivalence conservation. The latter form of con­
servation would seem to require, in addition, the 
utilization of immediate past experience in the form 
of a deductive argument (Elkind, 1967, p. 17).
The only available experimental investigation of this 
question is a study by Nair reported by Bruner, Olver and 
Greenfield (1966). She trained conservers and nonconservers 
to recognize identity and equivalence of water poured from 
one container to another. She concluded that "a recogni­
tion of identity is a necessary, if not a sufficient con­
dition, for the recognition of quantitative equivalence" 
(Bruner, et al., 1966, p. 1&9). She also concluded that 
for children who already conserve, conservation responses 
"are stimulated by ’reminding’ the child first about iden­
tity (p. 191)." As for nonconservers, a reminder about 
identity seemed to cause them to have a more perceptual 
orientation immediately, though ultimately it succeeded in 
helping them make conservation judgments.
If it is indeed the conservation of identity with 
which Piaget is concerned, then it may be supposed that he 
uses the standard to mark the original mass, so that the 
child will have something with which to compare the changed 
object. The question then arises, what if the child must 
use his memory of what the object was, and compare that 
with the object as it is now? Elkind (1967) has suggested 
that the problem of memory falsification would make a 
direct approach unpractical. However, there seem to be no 
direct investigations of this question. Therefore, a minor
20
area of concern for the present study will be to observe 
what effect will be obtained from presenting one object, 
changing it, and asking the child to use his memory in 
ascertaining whether the amounts are still the same.
Perceptual evaluation. A second topic for considera­
tion is the role of perception in conversation. Smedslund 
(1961a) tried to teach children to conserve weight by 
changing only the shapes of equal and unequal balls, and 
then using a scale to show them the results of the percep­
tual distortions. The children learned, but so did the 
control group who had no training. Hall and Kingsley (196$) 
indicate that failure to achieve results might have been 
related to the subjects’ lack of experience with scales. 
Strangely enough, Smedslund’s children improved signifi­
cantly on conservation of substance.
Wohlwill and Lowe (1962) also used reinforced 
practice of perceptual evaluation to teach conservation of 
number. Their task consisted of counting a number of corks 
and checking it against a card (behind which was a poker 
chip as a symbol of reward), then viewing a perceptual 
distortion of the row of corks and trying (without counting) 
to pick the card matching the number of corks in the dis­
torted row. If successful they could keep the chip to 
exchange for a reward later. This procedure failed to pro­
duce conservation of number.
Beilin (1965) attempted to show that in teaching
21
conservation of number and length, perceptual contrast 
alone, without any reinforcement or feedback, can in itself 
invoke conservation responses. He presented two stimulus 
configurations, identical in number and length (stimuli 
1 and 2), and a third stimulus (3) unequal to the other two 
in both number and length. The experimenter changed 
stimulus 1 to match the length of stimulus 3. The subject 
was then asked whether stimuli 1 and 2 were the same or 
different in number. This training condition was contrasted 
to a control group and to three other procedural groups, 
namely, nonreinforcement, verbal orientation reinforcement, 
and verbal rule instruction. In this study, subjects in 
perceptual evaluation training procedure did increase in 
number of conservation responses - from pretest to posttest. 
However, so did the subjects in the other three training 
procedures, as did the control subjects, with which they 
were contrasted; this result leaves the effectiveness of 
perceptual evaluation training in question.
With regard to isolated perceptual training, there has 
been some speculation that if children conserve because of 
misleading perceptual cues, then eliminating those cues 
would allow symbolic processes to operate uninhibited, and 
conservation would result. Frank, reported in Bruner 
et al. (1966), tried such a procedure. In testing for the 
conservation of volume, he used a screen to shield the 
pouring of liquid from one container to another. He found 
that in this situation children conserved, and that they
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continued to conserve after the screen was removed.
However, Sonstroem (reported in Bruner et al. , 1966} failed 
to increase the frequency of posttest conservation of sub­
stance responses when the standard had been shielded under 
a bowl while the stimulus object’s shape was changed. 
Fleishman, Gilmore, and Ginsburg (1966) also attempted to 
demonstrate the effect of screening out misleading percep­
tual cues. They taped over two bottles, leaving only small 
vertical slits through which the subjects could judge the 
original equality of amounts of water in the bottles. They 
turned the slit sides away from the subjects and laid one 
of the bottles on its side. No feedback was given. Their 
subjects, like Sonstroem’s, failed to conserve.
Compensation. The general failure of perceptual 
training to evoke conservation may be due to the fact that 
the type of perception involved in conservation is what is 
called compensation, i.e., the understanding of reciprocity 
between two relevant dimensions. Sonstroem (reported in 
Bruner et al., 1966) showed that stressing the two dimen­
sions, and comparing each dimension of the two objects used 
in training, is effective in teaching conservation of sub­
stance, especially when this procedure is combined with 
allowing the subjects to transform the shapes of the objects 
themselves. Similarly, Roeper and Sigel (1966) taught 
groups of children that objects can be classified into more 
than one category (multiple classification) and that
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dimensions are gradations and are not absolute (seriation). 
When paired with reversibility training, this procedure 
aided children in attaining conservation of substance.
Carey (in Bruner et al., 1966) has shown that nonconservers 
also may understand compensation, which suggests that com­
pensation is not a sufficient condition for conservation.
Addition-subtraction. If conservation consists of 
abandoning perceptual evaluation for logical evaluation, and 
if understanding identity and compensation are not suffi­
cient alone to insure conservation, what is the relation of 
understanding the effects of addition and subtraction to 
conservation? Addition and subtraction are the logical 
processes that are assumed to function in the development 
of the conservation of substance (Lefrancois, I96&).
Smedslund (1961a) in the same experiment in which he 
used perceptual training also used addition-subtraction 
training with feedback to teach conservation of weight.
He found that the experimental subjects improved from pre­
test to posttest, but so did the control subjects. Again, 
the training seemed to transfer to conservation of sub­
stance.
Wallach, Wall and Anderson (1967) used an addition- 
subtraction training procedure in attempting to induce con­
servation of number. Their pretest procedure involved pair­
ing dolls and beds, then removing the dolls from the beds 
and placing them in such a way that either the line of dolls
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or the line of beds was longer. A judgment about equality 
was then requested. In the addition-subtraction training, 
the beds, with dolls in them, were screened from the sub­
ject and a doll was either removed or added. Following 
evaluation, the subject was allowed to see whether his 
answer was correct. The screen was then replaced and the 
subject helped reverse the procedure by handing the experi­
menter a doll or by taking the extra doll. Thus, the 
addition-subtraction training was done with a screening pro­
cedure, and with feedback. It failed to produce conserva­
tion.
Like Smedslund, Winer (1968) contrasted perceptual 
evaluation training with addition-subtraction training. He 
presented subjects with two equal rows of chips, and had the 
subjects witness an addition or subtraction of chips and 
then judge equality of number. They received no feedback.
On completion of the eighteen training trials the subjects 
were given twelve conflict trials and then the posttest.
That this procedure produced a significant number of cor­
rect responses both in the conflict trials and on the post­
test, he attributed to a stimulus set. To test this 
further, he contrasted an addition-subtraction-conflict 
group with an addition-subtraction-no conflict group, and 
found that both procedures evoked some conservation, but 
that the conflict procedure was slightly superior.
Reversibility. The final component of conservation
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to be discussed is reversibility, i.e., "the knowledge that 
if the defining attribute were brought back, . . . then the 
criterion of equality . . . would be observable again 
(Wallach and Sprott, 1964, p. 1067)." A reversibility 
procedure was used by Wallach and Sprott (1964) as a means 
of feedback. Coupled with addition-subtraction training in 
conflict with perceptual evaluation, it was successful in 
producing conservation of number. Their main concern in 
this study was the effect of addition-subtraction training 
on conservation, and they attributed its success, after the 
fact, to reversibility. Therefore, Wallach, Wall and 
Anderson (1967) attempted to determine if reversibility 
alone could induce conservation. They contrasted the 
addition-subtraction procedure with dolls described above 
(pp. 23-2 4) with perceptual manipulation, i.e., having 
either rows of dolls or beds longer without adding or sub­
tracting, and then reversing the manipulation by having the 
subject put the dolls back in the beds. They found that 
this reversibility training had a strong effect on inducing 
conservation.
Sonstroem (in Bruner et al., 1966) also used the 
reversibility procedure. She called it "inversion," and 
opposed it to compensation, i.e., labeling relevant percep­
tual cues before inversion and calling attention to them to 
help judge equality. In her study, it produced no signifi­
cant results, with or without screening, whether the subject 
or the experimenter performed the manipulations.
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Bruner et, al. (1966) mentions that after pouring 
liquid into different-shaped containers and asking if there 
was still the same amount (the standard conservation task) 
he asked what would happen if the liquid were poured back 
into the original, now empty, container. Twenty-seven of 
36 nonconservers said that the amount would be the same as 
before. Thus again, reversibility seems to be necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for conservation to occur.
The foregoing discussion suggests the great variety 
of procedures and results that research in the area of 
conservation has produced. A more detailed investigation 
of these studies would prove even more confusing, for very 
few of the experiments are directly comparable. However, 
keeping in mind that identity, perceptual understanding of 
addition-subtraction, compensation or combinativity, and 
reversibility are the cognitive elements that contribute to 
the development of conservation, let us look more closely 
at some questions related to the procedures used to induce 
conservation.
Conservation Training Procedures
Conflict. Perhaps the most significant concept to 
evolve from the investigation of conservation is that of 
cognitive conflict, originally developed by Smedslund 
(1961b) to explain how children acquire conservations of 
substance and weight.
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It is assumed that a person is confronted repeatedly 
with situations where the addition/subtraction and 
the deformation schemata come into contact. In some 
situations one of these schemata is activated much 
more strongly than the other, and the weaker schema 
is simply inhibited. But in many situations both the 
schemata are activated with approximately the same 
strength and a cognitive conflict will occur, some­
times evidenced by hesitation, looking back-and-forth, 
and signs of uneasiness and tension. Since the 
addition/subtraction schema presumably has greater 
clarity, simplicity and consistency, it will gradually 
or suddenly begin to dominate, whereas the deformation 
schema with its high degree of ambiguity, complexity 
and internal contradiction will be weakened and will 
eventually disappear completely, even in pure deforma­
tion situations without addition/subtraction (p. 157).
To test this new idea, Smedslund devised a series of
presentations which consisted of deforming one of two equal
objects, then adding or subtracting mass. This procedure
induced a conflict between expectations based on perceptual
cues and those based on the logical process of addition-
subtraction.
These presentations seemed to induce conservation in 
the absence of external reinforcement. Smedslund used the 
results to support the hypothesis, that concepts of conserva­
tion are acquired as a function of internal equilibrium 
rather than by external reinforcement. His implication was 
that Piaget was right, learning theory wrong.
However, Berlyne, whom Ausubel (1965) calls a neo- 
behaviorist cognitive theorist, has incorporated the con­
cept into his explanation of learning (1965). A cognitive 
conflict, he says, occurs whenever information contradicts 
further information or proves inadequate to solve a problem, 
regardless of whether the knowledge was obtained through
perception, through vicarious means via pictures, reports, 
or literature, or through inference. The failure of the 
child’s trial-and-error behavior to consistently sub­
stantiate his earlier conclusions creates a conflict between 
his perception of the world and the events he actually en­
counters, which in turn motivates him to investigate and re­
structure his modes of perception. The conflict has, within 
itself, both a motivational, and, through its reduction, a 
reinforcing aspect. With Berlyne’s explanation of cognitive 
conflict, Smedslund’s finding loses some of its theoretical 
importance in proving Piaget right and everyone else wrong. 
Despite contradicting theoretical explanations offered for 
it, the cognitive conflict procedure does lead to interest­
ing results in experimental situations.
Wohlwill and Lowe (1962) seem to be the first after 
Smedslund to use the conflict technique. In examining 
conservation of number they contrasted three treatment 
groups: (l) a dissociative, (2) a reinforced practice, and
(3) an addition-subtraction group. The subjects in the 
dissociative group merely counted the number of corks in a 
row, picked a card to match the number, and received a chip 
for each correct choice; the reinforced practice subjects 
received perceptual training (see p. 20). The third group 
was given conflict training interspersed with addition- 
subtraction trials. To induce conflict, the length of the 
row of corks was changed, and a cork was added or subtracted. 
They found improvement from pretest to posttest for all of
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the groups in the nonverbal exercises, but no transfer to 
the verbal posttest of conservation.
Gruen (1965) also tried to teach conservation of
number, using equal and unequal rows of corks. He changed)
the lengths of one row, had the subjects evaluate the 
equality of the two rows, then gave them feedback by allow­
ing them to count. His conflict trials consisted of deform­
ing one row, asking for an evaluation, removing a cork from 
the longer row, and asking for another evaluation. Thus, 
his procedure is different from the usual conflict pro­
cedure. in that both types of manipulations were not done at 
once. Perceptual change preceded addition-subtraction 
change; between the two there was an evaluation. Two other 
factors distinguished Gruen*s study. (1) He gave half the 
subjects in each group verbal pretraining. (2) He placed 
corks in a row and had his control subjects match the 
number so that the rows would be equal. His only signifi­
cant finding was that subjects in the conflict-verbal pre­
training condition showed more conservation than the control 
group without pretraining.
Winer (I96&) used rows of chips to teach conservation 
of length. He compared subjects who received l£ addition- 
subtraction trials and then 12 conflict trials with those 
having 13 perceptual trials and then 12 conflict trials.
The addition-subtraction training was more effective. To 
evaluate the contribution of the conflict procedure to the 
results, he then compared an addition-subtraction with-
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conflict procedure to an addition-subtraction without- 
conflict procedure. Both were effective in inducing 
conservation, though the conflict procedure was slightly 
more effective.
Smith (196$) used plasticine to teach conservation of 
weight. He used a replication of Smedslund’s conflict pro­
cedure, which he called addition-subtraction, and compared 
it with reinforced practice (i.e., perceptual training) and 
verbal rule instruction, which involved making a statement 
of the general principle of conservation of weight and then 
demonstrating reversibility. He found that the conflict 
condition did not produce conservation; only the verbal rule 
instruction did.
As mentioned in the discussion of reversibility train­
ing, Wallach and Sprott (1964) attempted to test the effects 
of reversibility with a doll-doll bed procedure, which they 
considered practice in addition and subtraction, but which 
also involved conflict. Fourteen of their 15 experimental 
nonconservers changed t'o conservation responses on the post­
test. None of the controls did. Moreover, 13 of the 15 
training subjects also conserved number when the same type 
of situation was presented using checkers placed On cards, 
i.e., there was transfer of learning to a similar problem.
Although the conflict procedure cannot consistently 
be distinguished as a more effective procedure than what­
ever procedure it was compared with, experiments in which 
it was one variable do seem to be successful in inducing
conservation.
Participation. In the natural acquisition of con­
servation the subject is actively involved in the manipula­
tion of the stimulus objects from which he eventually learns 
conservation. Yet in attempting to hasten the appearance 
of conservation, most experimenters havd the subjects merely 
observe and answer questions. This might be called passive 
participation. However, Wallach and Sprott (1964), Kingsley 
and Hall (1967) in part, Wohlwill and Lowe (1962) and 
Wallach, Wall and Anderson (1967) had the subjects actively 
participate by handling the demonstration objects. All but 
Wohlwill and Lowe had some measure of success in inducing 
conservat ion.
Sonstroem (in Bruner et al., 1966) made a direct 
investigation of this procedure. In teaching conservation 
of substance, she had half the subjects manipulate the 
plasticine themselves; the other half observed manipula­
tions. She combined this with presence or absence of com­
pensation training and presence or absence of screening.
Her significant results were due to an interaction between 
compensation and manipulation.
Verbal vs. performance methods and the problem 
of vocabulary. This leads to one of the major contro­
versies about the method used to investigate conservation. 
Most experimenters use an adaptation of Piaget’s clinical 
method. Elkind (1961b) and Pratoomraj and Johnson
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(1966) have found that, just as Piaget contended, judgments 
(answers to the conservation question concerning the 
equality of two objects), predictions about equality after 
future deformations, and evaluations (explanations of what 
made the equality evident) were equivalent signs of con­
servation. Therefore, great leeway has been taken in ques­
tioning, and much credence has been put in the child's 
explanation of his answers. It would seem that such a pro­
cedure would be conducive to experimenter bias.
In addition to this objection, Braine (1959) has shown 
that using performance tests rather than verbal procedures 
allows the demonstration of conservation in children several 
years younger than those in whom Piaget was able to detect 
conservation. He therefore advocates abandoning the tra­
ditional procedure. There is, of course, some objection 
to his stance. For example, Halford (1968) has suggested 
that only verbal methods can determine whether a child by 
chance performed the right answer, or whether he actually 
thinks conservation is a logical necessity.
Ages of children used in conservation studies vary 
from four to ten years, though in most studies the range is 
more limited. The particular age used depends on the type 
of conservation under investigation. Especially with the 
younger children, understanding of the vocabulary pertinent 
to the investigation is a matter of concern. Griffith, 
Shantz, and Sigel (1967) have shown that the term "same” is 
not spontaneous and that responses calling for an evaluation
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response of ’’more" or ’’less” are correct significantly 
more often than those requiring a "same” response. Hall and 
Kingsley (1963), who used different names for the same­
shaped demonstration object, found that the label given an 
object made a difference in the number of correct conserva­
tion responses made to that object. Perhaps it is this 
language factor that explains the success Sonstroem (in 
Bruner, et al., 1966) had with compensation training. She 
may have taught an understanding of vocabulary as well as an 
orientation to compare dimensions. Failure of Beilin’s 
(196$} verbal orienting reinforcement procedure indicates 
that the ability to give the correct verbal response is not 
sufficient to insure performance success. However, the 
general success that he and other experimenters (Kingsley 
& Hall, 1967; Smith, 196&) have had with his verbal rule 
instruction indicates that verbalization of the concept is 
a successful procedure to use in teaching conservation.
Reinforcement. Two kinds of reinforcement, external 
reward and feedback, have been used in conservation studies. 
Reinforced practice will be considered first.
The reinforcement used in conservation studies 
usually consists of awarding a token for a correct response; 
the tokens are then later exchanged for more meaningful 
rewards. Wohlwill and Lowe (1962), using a row of corks 
whose number was to be matched to the number on a card, 
allowed their subjects to keep the chip behind a correct 
card. Both addition-subtraction groups and perceptual
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training groups improved on the nonverbal posttest, but 
there was no transfer to a verbal posttest.
Beilin (196$) reinforced subjects choosing the row of 
corks with the same number as the standard by sounding a 
buzzer and awarding the subject a token. His procedure 
produced no significant improvement.
Feedback reinforcement was used by Smedslund (196ld); 
he showed the subject whether he was right or wrong by 
employing a scale to demonstrate the change or lack of 
change in weight. No differences between experimental and 
control subjects were obtained.
Gruen (196$) allowed subjects to count corks to learn 
conservation of number. Wallach, Wall and Anderson (1967) 
contrasted an addition-subtraction procedure using feedback 
with reversibility training. Only the reversibility train­
ing had a strong effect on conservation.
As Fleishmann, et al. (1966) point out, there is much 
similarity between reversibility and feedback. Braine and 
Shanks (196$), for example, have used a reversibility pro­
cedure to help the subject evaluate the correctness of his 
answers to conservation questions, and have called it feed­
back. However, with such a conglomeration of variables 
affecting each experiment, it would seem best to distin­
guish between the two procedures and not to confound them.
An exception to that general rule would have to be 
made in the case of conservation of substance. Hall and 
Kingsley (I96&) have indicated that in this case there is
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no objective criterion by which to evaluate the correctness 
of a response, and any feedback would have to be in the 
form of reversibility training.
There are several criticisms that might be aimed at 
the studies of reinforcement, including their failure to 
consider fully the motivational state of the subjects. At 
present, the results of these studies indicate that the 
overall effects of the reinforcement procedures seem to be 
negligible in contributing to the development of conserva­
tion.
Selection of materials. The type of materials used 
in the training sessions has received little or no investi­
gation. There are two aspects to this problem area. On 
the one hand, there have been a great variety of materials 
used in teaching some of the conservations, such as the 
conservation of number. Chips (Winer, 196S), dolls 
(Wallach and Sprott, 1964), and corks (Gruen, 1965) have 
all been used, and there is no index of comparability by 
which the three materials can be evaluated.
On the other hand, there is the practical inability 
to isolate one particular conservation in order to achieve 
experimental control. It is impossible to deal with one 
type of conservation without at the same time involving 
other types. Any demonstration of the conservation of sub­
stance which uses liquid as the means has implicit in it a 
demonstration of conservation of volume. Using discontinuous
material, such as beads, involves conservation of number. 
Alteration of shape is confounded with conservation of 
length, height, or area. Adding or subtracting from the 
original substance alters its weight. In short, there is 
no practical way to isolate conservation of substance.
It is almost dissociable from weight and volume, all three 
being measures of quantity. Although it is improbable that 
a child incapable of conservation of substance would be 
receptive to whatever cues distinguish that conservation 
from others in specific situations, an attempt should be 
made to use materials and procedures more applicable to con­
servation of substance than to other conservations.
Problems and Hypotheses 
Resolution of Procedural Problems
On the basis of the problems that became evident 
through the review of literature, the present study 
focused on training procedures and implemented specific 
controls relevant to the stimulus material and verbal 
stimuli. An attempt was made to investigate the effects 
that two training procedures, cognitive conflict and active 
participation, have in accelerating the appearance of con­
servation of substance. In testing for procedural effects, 
equivalent content components were used across all groups. 
Training consisted of experiences in perceptual evaluation 
and addition-subtraction. There was no direct training in 
compensation; however, comparative dimensional words were of
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necessity used in commenting on the transformations taking 
place, and it was expected that this would produce some 
orientation toward compensation in some subjects. As an 
alternative to feedback, a reversibility procedure was 
employed at the end of every trial.
Cognitive conflict training was compared to non­
conflict training. The general differences between these 
procedures involved a combination of addition-subtraction 
and perceptual training. Both training groups were pre­
sented with the same stimulus configurations, and overall, 
the same manipulations were performed. However, in the 
non-conflict procedure, the perceptual distortions formed 
one series and the additions or subtractions another; 
across subjects the order of presentation of these series 
was alternated.
Active participation training was contrasted with 
passive participation training. The general difference 
between the active and the passive procedures was that the 
subjects in the active condition actually performed the 
manipulations on the training materials themselves, while 
the subjects in the passive condition only observed the 
manipulations and then answered questions about them. It 
was expected that because the passive group would receive 
only visual experience while the active group would receive 
the additional sensorimotor experience, the active pro­
cedure would be more successful in effecting conservation.i
To insure that the pre­
tapping the same conservation
and posttests were in fact 
of substance as the training
procedures, Play-Doh was employed throughout. However, to 
minimize direct transfer effects, the forms of the Play-Doh 
were different in the pre- and posttests from those in the 
training sessions. Thus, in testing, the initial shape was 
always a ball, and most of the shapes made were distinct 
objects. In training, the basic shape was a cylinder, 
either longer or shorter, thinner or fatter, and either on 
its side or on its end. The changes stressed the altera­
tion of dimensions.
The development of the verbal stimulus procedure in­
volved several decisions. The first was that only two 
choices would be offered. It was felt that children who 
were young enough not to conserve substance would be con­
fused by a variety of choices, and so the number was 
limited to two. They had to choose between "more" and 
’’same." The use of "same" is self-evident. "More” was 
used in the comparison in preference to "different" because 
it, like "same," has one syllable whereas "different" has 
three, and also because both "more" and "same" have soft 
consonants, in contrast to the sharper sounds in "differ­
ent." "More" was used in preference to "less" because 
4- to 6- year-old children seem to understand it better 
than "less."
The selection of terms used in the training procedure
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was dictated by the instructions given the subjects in the 
active group in directing them to perform the required 
transformations of the materials. Although the subjects in 
the passive condition did not manipulate the materials, the 
experimenter described the transformations she performed, 
employing terms identical to those included in the instruc­
tions to the subjects in the active group. For example, 
if the active instructions were, "Make it longer by adding 
this extra amount to the end," then the passive comment 
was, "See, I’m making it longer by adding this extra amount 
to the end."
Hypotheses
The following predictions apply to this investigation
(1) All training procedures will contribute to the 
acquisition of conservation of substance.
(2) The cognitive conflict procedure will be more 
effective in inducing conservation of substance than will 
the non-conflict procedure.
(3) The active participation procedure will be more 
effective in inducing conservation of substance than will 




A pretest-training-posttest procedure was employed to 
investigate the principal hypotheses of this study. The 
experimental conditions were tested by using a 2 x 2 design 
with a common control group (Winer, 1962, p. 263).
Subjects
A total of 114 nursery school and kindergarten 
children were pretested, and of these, 55 met the dual 
selection criteria (to be explained later) of nonconserva­
tion and adequate understanding of the required training 
vocabulary. Three eligible Ss were not included because 
of absences from school during the training periods. Nine 
Ss were assigned to each of the four training conditions, 
and the remaining 16 constituted the control group. The 
experimental and control groups were equated for number of 
nursery school and kindergarten children and for chrono­
logical age (see Table 3). Because past investigations 
have failed to show evidence of sex differences, groups 
were not equated on this factor.
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N Mean Range N Mean Range N Mean Range
Active Conflict 4 5;0 4; 2—6;0 5 6; 2 5;9—6;5 9 5;B 4;2-6;5
Passive Conflict 3 5;4 4;7-5;10 6 6; 1 $;7-6;2 9 5 ;9 4;7—6;2
Active Non-conflict 4 4; 11 4;6-5;6 5 5; 10 5;9-6;2 9 5;5 4;6-6;2
Passive Non-conflict 3 4;S 4;5-4;ll 6 5;9 5;6-6;6 9 5;5 4;5-6;6
Control B 5;2 4; 3-6;1 B 6; 0 5;7—6;4 16 5;7 4;3 - 6 ;4
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Apparatus
Two different sets of materials were used, one for 
the vocabulary pretest and the other for the conservation 
pretest, the training, and the posttest. The vocabulary 
pretest apparatus consisted of six plastic blocks, a blue 
and a yellow of each of the following dimensions:
3 x lg x lg inches, lj x lg x lg inches, and lg x lg x ll/l6 
inches; a 12 x 16 inch flowered plexiglass tray; two six- 
ounce clear plastic glasses; and a ceramic cream pitcher.
The other set of materials included a 12 x 13s x £ inch 
masonite board on which were centered two dots seven inches 
apart, and four colors of the Play-Doh (red, blue, yellow, 
and white). The Play-Doh was divided into one of the 
following shapes: (l) a ''pancake," approximately 4 inch 
thick and 2 inches in diameter; (2) a "snake" approximately 
7 inches long and g inch in diameter; (3) a piece approxi­
mately 2g inches long and 3/4 inches in diameter, called a 
"sausagq" when lying on its side and a "tower" when stand­
ing on end; and (4 ) a ball. There were two objects of each 
color, and an additional piece of each color which could be 
used to add substance to any object.
In addition, incentive objects (pieces of gum, sour 
balls, suckers, candy kisses, butterscotch balls, fudgies, 




Each S was seen individually in a room equipped with 
a child-sized table and two small chairs. The S sat across 
the table from the E, with the materials between them.
Pretests
The pretests were designed to eliminate from the 
sample (1) Ss who failed to understand the basic vocabulary 
necessary for the pretest conservation trials and training, 
and (2) conservers.
The vocabulary pretest was divided into two sections 
on the basis of the type of materials used, namely, blocks 
and glasses with water. To be included in the experiment 
a S had to pass all but two items in each section. For the 
vocabulary test, two different-shaped blocks of the same 
color were presented, and S was asked to demonstrate by 
pointing that he understood the relational term, e.g., 
"Which one is longer?" The combinations of blocks and 
terms are shown in Table 4. Blocks within a combination 
were of the same color, but every second trial the color 
was alternated. One half of the Ss were presented the 
yellow blocks on the first trial, and the other half, the 
blue.
Upon completion of the block procedure, the tray, 
with two empty glasses and the pitcher full of water, was 
placed before the S. He was asked to pour some water into 
one of the glasses, which then became glass A. E, pointing
TABLE 4
Stimuli and Terms Presented in 
Block Pretest
Blocks Terms
Cube and square .................. Fatter
Rectangle and cube...............  Longer
Cube and square ..................Thicker
Rectangle and cube ...............  Shorter (
Cube and square ..................  Thinner
Rectangle and cube ................ Taller
Cube and square . .................Flatter
Cube and square .................. Skinnier
Rectangle and cube ...............  Shorter (




to the designated glass, instructed S as follows:
1. Pour a different amount into this glass (B).
2. Make them have the same amount.
3. Make this glass (A) have more water.
4* Make this glass (B) have less water.
$. Add to this glass (A).
6. Take away from this glass (B).
7. Make this glass (A) have not as much water.
Because understanding the concept of sameness was considered 
so basic to this experiment, the second item (making the 
glasses have the same amount) was considered essential; no
S who failed on this item was included in the experiment.
To avoid chance success, the S had to be observed comparing 
water levels to pass the item. Passing the first item also 
involved active comparison of water levels, but the term 
"different” was not considered essential. For item 4, 
making glass B have less, two responses were considered 
correct. The preferred response was to have the S pour 
some water out of the glass, but, if the S, who had just 
made glass A have more, added a smaller amount to glass B 
and was observed to compare the glasses to be sure glass B 
had less than glass A, this also was accepted.
A S who successfully completed the vocabulary test 
was administered the conservation pretest. The first part 
(three trials) of this pretest was intended to investigate 
the possibility of using a procedure involving only
46
conservation of identity. The second part (six trials) was 
designed to pick out those Ss who already conserved sub­
stance. Thus the second part only was used in determining 
the conservation score, which was then used in selecting 
Ss. To be included in the experiment, a S was allowed 
only one conservation response. Those who responded with 
more than one conservation response were considered either 
transitional conservers or full conservers and were 
excluded from the sample.
The nine nonreinforced trials of the conservation 
pretest were administered in the following manner. In all 
trials Play-Doh was placed on the masonite board, a shape 
was formed by the E (see Appendix A for description of 
shapes) and the 5 was asked either (l) if one object had 
more Play-Doh than the other, or if they had the same 
amount, or else (2) if they had the same amount or if 
either one had more Play-Doh than the other. The positions 
of the words ’’same” and "more" were reversed every second 
trial, and across Ss the initial stimulus word was alter­
nated. If S answered just "more" he was asked, "Which one 
has more?" Finally, he was asked "How do you know?"
For the first three trials one ball of Play-Doh was 
presented to S, then transformed into a different shape, 
and he was asked to compare the amount in the new shape 
with the amount the object had had as a ball.
On the final six trials two balls of the same color
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were placed one on each dot on the masonite board. E asked 
S if the balls had the same amount of Play-Doh. If S said 
"no,” he was asked how they could be made the same, and 
whatever he suggested was done. When he was satisfied that 
they were the same, the shape of one, as shown in 
Appendix A, was changed and he was asked the conservation 
question, then asked how he knew his answer was right.
Training
The general design of the training procedure was an 
attempt to give all groups approximately equivalent ex­
perience with the same materials, performing the same activ 
ities. Each training condition consisted of thirty-two 
trials. Each S was presented all thirty-two trials unless 
he reached a criterion of four successive correct trials 
before he completed the entire series. A record was kept 
of the number of sessions and the length of each session. 
With the exception of those cases in which Ss reached 
criterion earlier, the average length of a session was 
20 minutes, varying a maximum of five minutes more or less. 
Two Ss failed to complete the training schedule in four 
sessions; at this point their training was discontinued.
In all training conditions the S was shown two equal, 
similarly shaped pieces of Play-Doh, both of the same 
color, which were then changed if necessary, until S was 
satisfied they were the same. Then whatever object trans­
formation the training schedule called for was made. The
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standard conservation question, "Does one have more than 
the other, or do they have the same amount?" was asked, 
with the positions of the stimulus words ("more" and "same") 
being changed every second time. Following S’s response 
he was asked, "How do you know?" If he failed to respond 
to the latter question, he was asked "What makes you think 
they have the same amount?" or "How can you tell that one 
has more?" Following this judgment, S was asked to predict 
what would happen if the object transformation were re­
versed, e.g., "What if we make this snake back into a pan­
cake? Would it still have more Play-Doh, or would they- 
have the same amount of Play-Doh then?" Finally, the 
suggested transformation was made and S was requested to 
evaluate the results with the question, "Now does one have 
more Play-Doh than the other or do they have the same 
amount ?"
During the manipulations E commented on what was 
happening, e.g., mentioning the dimension changes that were 
taking place. However, this was not stressed and the S was 
not called on to make distinctions. Specific differences 
among the four training groups are described below.
Active non-conflict treatment. In this condition, 
experience in addition-subtraction and in perceptual evalua­
tion were presented separately. The S himself made the 
changes in the shape of the Play-Doh as outlined in 
Appendix B. Half the Ss were given addition-subtraction
training first, and half were given perceptual evaluation 
training first. The trials within each type of training 
were presented in one of two predetermined random orders.
It was required that the criterion of four successive 
correct trials be achieved in respect to each type of 
training.
Passive non-conflict treatment. The same materials 
and orders given the active non-conflict group and shown in 
Appendix B were used here. The only difference was that 
E instead of S performed the actual manipulations. The S 
participated by observing and answering the questions.
Passive conflict treatment. In this condition, 
experiences in addition-subtraction and in perceptual 
evaluation were presented in each trial. Half of the pre­
diction questions directed attention to perceptual changes 
and the other half to addition-subtraction changes. For 
example, if a snake were made longer and then a piece were 
subtracted, E could ask either, "What if we make this snake 
as thick as it was— then will they have the same amount of 
Play-Doh or will one have more Play-Doh than the other?" 
or he could ask, "What if we put on this piece that we took 
off--then will they have the same amount of Play-Doh or 
will one have more Play-Doh than the other?" The training 
items used in conflict training are presented in Appendix C. 
One of two random orders of presentation was used. In this
49
50
procedure S performed the manipulations while S partici­
pated by observing and answering questions.
Active conflict treatment. The same training trials 
and orders described in the discussion of the passive con­
flict procedure and presented in Appendix C were used.
S, however, performed the manipulations himself at the 
direction of E.
Posttest
To determine what change there had been in the amount 
of conservation, a posttest was given all Ss. The posttest 
was essentially a repetition of the pretest except that the 
conservation portion was given first and the vocabulary part 
last. The control Ss received only the conservation part.
In all cases care was taken to present the same wording as 
had been used in the pretest for each S,
The posttest was administered to each experimental 
S the day after completion of his training. The time be­
tween pre- and posttest varied from one to two weeks, de­
pending on how soon after the pretest the training was 
begun and how long the S needed to complete training. To 
control for the time factor between pretest and posttest, 
a control S was given the posttest before the first experi­




The principal hypotheses of this study are concerned 
with the differential effects of training conditions on the 
increase in ability to conserve substance. To measure 
these effects, each individual’s conservation pretest score 
was subtracted from his posttest score, yielding a differ­
ence score. Frequency distributions of the difference 
scores for each group are presented in Figure 1. It is 
evident that these distributions tend to be bimodal. For 
this reason nonparametric statistics were used to assess 
the results of training.
To test the general effect of training, the four 
treatment groups were combined and compared as a whole with 
the control group. For this, a Mann-Whitney U  Test with a 
z transformation (Sigel, 1965) was used (Table 5). The 
difference between the conservation scores of the combined 
treatment groups and those of the control group was signi­
ficant (z = 2.67, £ < .01).
To test the differences among training conditions, a 
series of Mann-Whitney Tests was used (Table 5). They 
indicated that only the difference between the conflict and 
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for Training Effects
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To Insure that the significant difference in favor of 
the combined treatment groups over the control group re­
flected improvement in conservation, pre- and posttest 
vocabulary scores were examined. A separate vocabulary 
score, defined as the number of correct responses, was 
obtained for the pre- and posttest. The pretest score 
was used in a one-way analysis of variance (Winer, 19^2) as 
a check on the original equating of the groups on language 
comprehension. The F (.88, > .10) proved nonsignificant
(Table 6). Further, a two-x^ay analysis of variance 
(McNemar, 19^9) of the posttest scores for the treatment 
subjects indicated no differences among the treatment groups 
(Table 6). Finally, a t test of the pre- and posttest 
scores for the combined treatment groups showed no differ­
ence in the means of the two tests (t = .18, ja > .10), con­
firming the contention that conservation training did not 
effect an increase in vocabulary scores from pre- to 
posttest.
Procedural Factors
It is apparent that the training procedures and not 
vocabulary training effected conservation. Because it is 
also of interest to note what aspects of training were 
operating, other factors were examined. Variables con­
sidered included differences in total time in training, in 
number of sessions, in errors, and in trials completed, 
first among treatment groups and secondly between conservers
55
TABLE 6
Pretest and Posttest Vocabulary Score Means 
and Standard Deviations, Analyses of 
Variance, and t Test of 
Differences in Means
A. Means and StandardI Deviations
Group Pretest PosttestMean SD Mean SD
Active Conflict 14.89 1.20 14.67 .94Passive Conflict 15.33 1.33 15.33 1.33Active Non-conflict 14.67 1.15 14.78 1.22Passive Non-conflict 15; oil 1.60 14.78 1.30Control 14■ .75 1.41
B. Analyses of Variance
• Pretest Scores
Source SS df MS F P
Groups 6.7J6 4 1.69 .88 NS
Error 82.7r8 48 1.93
Posttest Scores
Amount of
Conflict (A) ;o 1 .50 .28 NS
Type of Partici-pation (B) l.C)0 1 1.00 .56 NS
A x B .5>5 1 .95 .53 NS
Within Cells 57.11 32 1.78
C. Mean Standard Deviations and t Test of Differences in 
Pretest and Posttest Scores for 
_________________Combined Treatment Groups_______________
Pretest Posttest
Mean SD Mean SD t P
.IS15.00 1.32 14.89 1.19 NS
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and nonconservers summed across all training conditions.
Table 7 presents a series of analyses of variance 
(McNemar, 1962) among treatment groups made to ascertain 
whether or not training procedures were similar from group 
to group, and further, to determine whether the tendency 
toward a significant difference in conservation scores be­
tween conflict and non-conflict groups was due to the type 
of training. The sources of the data are as follows:
1. Total time in training: the number of minutes in 
each session from presentation of the first trial until 
choice of incentive object was offered, summed across all 
sessions.
2. Number of sessions: the number of times the sub­
ject left his classroom to participate in training.
3. Number of errors: the number of trials in which 
either judgment, prediction, or evaluation (assessing the 
correctness of prediction) was wrong (the prediction and 
evaluation had not been factors in the conservation tests).
4. Number of trials completed: the total number of 
presentations given each subject, including criterion 
trials.
Table 7 indicates that the subjects in the conflict 
group had a significantly greater number of sessions than 
the non-conflict subjects (jg <.0l). Moreover, although the 
results are not quite significant, it points to the fact 
that the conflict Ss also received a larger number of
57
Summary of Analyses of Variance 
for Procedural Variables
TABLE 7
A. Total Time in Training
Source SS df MS F P
Amount of Conflict (A) t2040 1 2040 4.11 NS
Type of Participation (B) 420 1 420 .S4 NSA x B n o 1 n o .22 NS
Within Cells 15924 32 4 9s
B. Number <jf Sessions
Source SS df MS F P
Amount of Conflict (A) t5.25 1 6.25 S.92 .01Type of Participation (B) .03 1 .03 .04 NSA x B .03 1 .03 .04 NSWithin Cells 2:2. 44 32 .70
C. Number of Error:5 Made in Training
Source SS df MS F P
Amount of Conflict (A) 3:2.11 1 32.11 .66 NSType of Participation (B) 20.7S 1 20.7S .43 NSA x B 109.7S 1 109.7S 2.29 NSWithin Cells 1547.33 32 4S
D. Number of Trials Completed
Source SS df MS F P
Amount of Conflict (A) 9 3.6 9 1 96.69 2.13 NSType of Participation (B) 17.36 1 17.36 .36 NSA x B L.37 1 1.37 .03 NSWithin Cells 1526.39 32 47.72
trials, and that they spent more time in training than the 
non-conflict Ss. Perhaps what accounts for the non­
conflict Ss’ receiving fewer trials was the fact that they 
reached criterion on the addition-subtraction relatively 
quickly. When their addition-subtraction trials were com­
pared to their perceptual evaluation trials, a t test 
indicated that significantly more perceptual trials than 
addition-subtraction were given (t = 2.7, £ <.0l).
The same procedural variables were considered with 
respect to differences between conservers and nonconservers 
determined by the posttest conservation score and combined 
across treatment groups. The results of t tests are shown 
in Table 3. It is evident that the nonconservers were 
given significantly more trials (jd <.05), made more errors 
(j> <  .01), and obtained a higher error rate (jo <  .05) than 
the conservers.
These tests indicate that overall the conservers were 
meeting the criterion and dropping out of training with a 
fewer number of sessions, a shorter total time, and fewer 
trials than the nonconservers. This raises the question of 
why the treatment which produced the most conservers 
(conflict) would, as a whole, require more sessions, while 
the condition which produced the smaller number of conser­
vers (non-conflict) would require fewer sessions. To 
investigate this problem, the conserver and nonconserver 
groups were further divided on the basis of whether they had
TABLE g












Number of Sessions 2.70 1.07
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3.10 .Si
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received conflict or non-conflict training and were com­
pared as to number of trials. The t test results, shown in 
Table 9, indicate that three of the groups were essentially 
alike as to average number of trials, whereas the fourth, 
the conservers who had conflict training, received signifi­
cantly more trials. It is also apparent from the standard 
deviations that the variability in number of trials given 
was greater for the nonconservers than for the conservers.
Nonprocedural Factors
The assumption that age is not a primary factor in 
the acquisition of conservation was tested by ranking the 
treatment subjects by age, classifying them as conservers 
(two or more correct responses on the conservation post­
test) or nonconservers (no more than one correct response), 
and applying a Mann-Whitney Tf Test. The Xf value of 126 
was not significant (jd >  .10) indicating that age was not a 
factor in the susceptibility of subjects to the training 
procedures.
One of the minor problems of interest in this study 
was the relation of the identity-type pretest questions to 
the more traditional conservation questions (see p. IS).
The possibility of such a relationship was investigated by 
means of the contingency coefficient C (Sigel, 1956).
All Ss tested for conservation, including the natural 
conservers (N = 26) were classified as high or low scorers 
on each type of pretest question, creating a 2 x 2
TABLE 9
Differences in the Number of Trials between 
Conservers and Nonconservers in Conflict And Non-conflict Training Conditions
Training t tests
Conflict Non-conflict
Group N Mean SD Group N Mean SD t P
Conservers 11 20.45 6.7 Conservers 7 19.42 6o4 0.33 NS
Nonconservers 7 30.2$ 4.2 Nonconservers 11 21.13 2.3 5.54 <.01
Conservers 11 20.45 6.7 Nonconservers 11 21.13 2.3 0.31 NS
Nonconservers 7 30.23 4.2 Conservers 7 19.42 6.4 5.67 <.01
contingency table. The maximum possible C under this con­
dition is .707; the obtained C was .41, which is significant 
(p < .01), indicating that there is a relationship between 
responding to identity-type conservation questions and 
equality type questions.
The differential effect of conservation training on 
identity and equality questions was investigated by sub­
tracting each treatment S’s pretest score from his posttest 
score on both the identity and equality questions and 
classifying the subjects as to high or low scorers on both 
variables. This resulted in a 2 x 2 contingency table 
yielding a G value of .40 (p <.01) indicating that the 
training procedures affected both types of questions in 





The highly significant difference between the control 
group and the treatment groups confirms the hypothesis that 
conservation of substance can be induced. However, the 
particular factors in the training that are responsible for 
this increase in conservation are not so easy to discern.
It is possible that the content of the training was suffi­
cient in itself, regardless of the method used. However, 
the difference between the conflict and the non-conflict
groups is teasingly close to significance; in fact, it is
significant under a directional hypothesis at the ,0$ level. 
It seems likely that a slightly larger sample would have 
made this difference more clear; it is regrettable that more 
subjects were not available.
Although, as a whole the conflict group had more 
sessions than the non-conflict group, its greater effective­
ness cannot be attributed to this, for there is essentially 
no difference in the number of trials the conservers in each 
group received. The difference seems to result from the 
behavior of the nonconservers in the two treatment con­
ditions. The conflict nonconservers took significantly 
longer in terms of number of trials than the non-conflict
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nonconservers; the latter subjects reached a criterion 
before they had actually learned to conserve. What seemed 
to be happening was that the non-conflict subjects reached 
criterion on the addition-subtraction part of their training 
approximately half way through, and so their training was 
stopped. This is borne out by comparison of the number of 
addition-subtraction trials with the number of perceptual 
evaluation trials. Meanwhile, their counterparts in the 
conflict condition continued on through all thirty-two of 
the trials. Perhaps if the non-conflict subjects had been 
given the rest of the trials they would have learned to con­
serve. That possibility, however, seems unlikely to the 
investigator. Certainly the subjects understood the prin­
ciples of addition and subtraction. Had more trials been 
given their reactions would be unpredictable, for signs of 
impatience were evident in some subjects during only four 
criterion trials, and it is the experimenter’s opinion that 
their cooperation would have been lost had they been ex­
pected to go through many more trials.
This outcome, i.e., having the subjects reach cri­
terion soon after training started and still not conserving, 
was not expected. Wallach, Wall, and Anderson (1957) re­
ported that their addition-subtraction group took more 
trials to reach criterion than their conflict group. How­
ever, it does support the contention that understanding of 
addition and subtraction is a component, necessary but not
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sufficient, in the attainment of conservation.
Another method for presenting addition-subtraction and 
perceptual evaluation training might be considered. Having 
alternate trials of the W o  procedures would avoid the monof 
ony of repitition while still separating the two components. 
This procedure should produce some conflict in that a par­
ticular set could not be kept from trial to trial, but the 
elements of the response would be more clearly separated 
than in the usual conflict situation.
There seemed to be one element in the active partici­
pation condition which might explain its failure to produce 
conservation of substance. The subjects in the active 
group were unable, for the most part, to return the object 
to its former shape. When they said that the reformed 
object was not like the standard, they were right; it 
certainly did not look like the standard. What advantage 
they may have gained from handling the Play-Doh was at 
least partially lost in their failure to realize completely 
the effects of reversibility. Since for conservation of 
substance there has been no other objective criterion de­
vised for evaluating the correctness of an answer, the 
failure of complete reversibility to be accomplished by 
some subjects may have affected the training program.
In this situation the subjects might have been helped 
more in their attempts to ’'Make it like it was”; however, 
the experimenter felt that such a procedure would prejudice
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the results, since the subjects would be taking cues from 
the experimenter rather than the stimuli.
The final problem to be discussed is that of the con­
servation test. As a preface to its discussion, the signif­
icance of the correlation between identity and equality 
questions on the pretest used in this study might be men­
tioned. The question of conservation of identity may be 
more measurable than has previously been supposed. The 
significant correlation between pretest and posttest scores 
would suggest that the training was also effective in pro­
ducing conservation of identity.
The subjects used in training were, on the basis of 
the pretest, either nonconservers or very marginal transi­
tional conservers. Yet, of the subjects who learned con­
servation, the large majority changed from nonconserver to 
full conserver, skipping the transitional stage. This fact, 
coupled with the knowledge that such a large majority of the 
natural conservers given the pretest were complete conser­
vers, would seem to indicate a failure of the pretest to 
designate the transitional conservers, and would thus 
explain the large number of subjects who changed so com­
pletely with the short amount of training that they were 
given. These subjects were most likely transitional con­
servers, who, with a bit of pushing (via training) made 
what appeared to be a large gain in the comprehension of 
conservation. This bit of logic is underscored by the
67
experimenter's impression that several of the posttest non- 
conservers were beginning to change their modes of response 
toward the end of training, i.e., they were changing their 
perceptual set to consider other dimensions. Yet on the 
posttest, with no feedback to force them into really con­
sidering the new alternative, they chose their more habitual 
mode of responding. As Piaget might say, their training had 
begun to disturb their state of equilibrium, but when given 
a chance they fell back into a stage that was stabilized.
What this seems to indicate is that a reliable test of 
conservation needs to be developed, one that does not depend 
on the experimenter's evaluation of a subject’s explanation 
of a response. Perhaps the work being done by Lefrancois 
(1963) will set an example. At any rate, until this is 
done, no result from any experiment, no matter how statis­




This study was conducted to investigate the effective­
ness of two methods of training, cognitive conflict and ac­
tive participation, in inducing the conservation of sub­
stance. In developing the training procedures an attempt 
was made (l) to spell out more formally than is usual in the 
experiments in this field the particular cognitive compo­
nents of the concept and how each was involved in the train­
ing, (2) to state more explicitly just what stimuli were pre­
sented in both testing and training, and (3) to describe more 
fully some of the variables within the training conditions.
Only one of the three hypotheses of this study was un­
equivocally supported by the results, namely that the train­
ing procedures as a whole did induce conservation. The 
greater effectiveness of active as compared to passive par­
ticipation was not demonstrated, though the superiority of 
the conflict training as compared to the particular non­
conflict procedure employed tended toward significance.
It may be concluded from this study that (l) the 
appearance of conservation can be hastened through training, 




Stimuli Used in Conservation Test
Starting Shapes New Shape of Changed Object Defining Dimensions
1. One white ball Pencil 5 inches long
2. One red ball Circle standing in 
edge 3s inch diameter
3. One blue ball Equilateral triangle 3 inch sides
4. Two red balls Ring
5. Two yellow balls Bowl
6. Two blue balls Cross
7. Two white balls Bridge
8. Two yellow balls Hill
9. Two red balls
9 inch circumference
2\ inches across, sides l£ inches 
high
3 2 inches high, arms 2\ inches 
wide
5 inch long arc
3s inches high, four-sided pyramid








1. Blue snake Tower2. red sausage snake
3. yellow tower sausage4. yellow pancake tower
5. blue pancake sausage6. red snake longer snake
7. white snake sausageS. white pancake snake
9. blue tower snake10. yellow snake pancake11. yellow sausage fatter sausage12. red pancake flatter, plate13. red tower pancake14. white sausage tower15. blue sausage pancake16. white tower taller, pole
B. Addition-subtraction Training
1. Blue tower - width2. yellow tower + width3. white pancake - width4. red sausage + length5. red snake - length6. blue sausage + height7. white sausage - hei ght 7S. red pancake + height9. yellow pancake - height10. blue snake - height11. blue pancake + wi dth V12. yellow snake + height13. red tower - height14. white snake + length15 • white tower + height16. yellow sausage - length
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Conflict Training Schedule
Shape presented First Change Second Change
APPENDIX C
1. Red tower2. blue tower
3. white snake
4. yellow tower
5. white pancake6. red sausage
7. white snakes. blue snake
9. yellow tower10. white sausage
11. yellow snake12. blue pancake
13. blue tower
14. yellow sausage
1$. white tower16. red pancake
17. yellow pancakeIS. red sausage





25. red pancake26. blue sausage
27. yellow pancake2S. red snake
29. blue snake30. yellow sausage
31. red snake32. blue pancake
Shorter, + height 
sausage, + length 
longer, - length
- width, wider
+ width, flatter 
pancake, - width 
tower, + height 
fatter, - length 
+ height, taller 
longer, + height pancake, - height 
+ height, taller
- height, taller 
+ length, thinner 
fatter, - height
- height, flatter 
snake, + height
+ height, shorter 
shorter, + length
- height, longer 
taller, + width snake, - length
- length, fatter 
taller, - height 
sausage, + length 
fatter, + length 
taller, - width 
longer, + height 

































readd height readd width
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